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that we had no privacy and that 
we should just “get over it”?
To overgeneralize, in the past, 
companies have violated privacy 
by exploiting data they collected. 
Today, privacy violations occur by 
exploiting deliberate (though of-
ten unwitting) choices individuals 
make. This change makes it hard-
er to combat the loss of privacy 
because the benefits of the action 
accrue directly to the individual.
Years ago, for example, you 
could only buy music by purchas-
ing a physical object containing it: a 
record, a tape, a CD. The purchase 
might be traceable, but only if the 
buyer used a traceable payment 
system, such as a check. Today, 
though, music can be leased online. 
Lease renewals inherently provide 
tracking data. Digital video record-
ers provide an even more striking 
example: the “record similar shows” 
feature often requires informing a 
central site of what you’ve watched.
Sometimes, financial induce-
ments persuade people to use 
traceable technologies. The pen-
alty for using cash ranges from 33 
percent on New York’s George 
Washington Bridge to 267 percent 
on the London Tube.
Another new phenomenon is 
that privacy-invading technologies 
are moving to the physical world. 
In several countries, toll highways 
work by cameras that read license 
plates and bill the vehicle owners. 
New York City is planning to use 
license plate cameras and OCR 
as part of an antiterrorist initia-
tive. The New York Times reports 
that “Data on each vehicle—its 
time-stamped image, license plate 
imprint and radiological signa-
ture—would be sent to a command 
center in Lower Manhattan, where 
it would be indexed and stored for 
at least a month.” Fighting terror-
ism is a good idea, but what else 
will this data be used for? Will it be 
available via subpoena to, say, di-
vorce lawyers?  (E-ZPass toll tran-
sponders records already are.)
In a post on a cryptography 
mailing list, Perry Metzger made 
the following observations:
“The time for focusing on the 
privacy implications of payment 
transponders and fare cards is 
over. … Digital cash toll col-
lection systems will not avoid 
records being kept of your car’s 
movements when cameras are 
reading and recording license 
plates anyway.
“Unfortunately, I don’t see any-
thing technological that people 
can reasonably do here to pro-
S
everal recent news stories have made me won-
der more about privacy. It’s not just that threats 
to privacy are increasing; rather, the problem 
is that the countervailing forces are becoming 
so much stronger. Was Scott McNealy right when he told us 
vide more privacy, at least short 
of everyone going everywhere 
on foot while wearing a burqa 
and periodically attempting to 
confuse the cameras. The solu-
tions, if any exist at all, appear 
to be non-technical.”
Traditionally, three methods 
preserve privacy: technology, 
market incentives, and regulation. 
It’s harder to use these for physi-
cal privacy invasions. There are no 
onion routing networks or digi-
tal cash systems that let us evade 
networked surveillance cameras. 
The market incentives appear to 
be working against privacy. That 
leaves regulation.
I t’s hard to argue with the ben-efits from the primary uses of all 
this collected data. E-ZPasses are 
faster than cash tolls, fighting ter-
rorism is a fine idea, and so on. As 
is frequently the case, the danger 
comes from the secondary uses of 
the  data—and the only solution is 
to legislate against it. Tell me about 
the movies I might like—but don’t 
use that information for advertising. 
Let me speed my way through the 
tunnels—but don’t tell any lawyers 
where I’ve been. Fight real terror-
ists, but don’t use their existence as 
an excuse to build an omnipresent 
surveillance system. In short, we 
need laws and regulations—and we 
need them to apply to government 
as well as to the private sector. 
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